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Abstract A welfare framework for the analysis of the spatial dimensions of
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tive environmental externalities, and various land use categories. Themodel is used to
compare rankings of spatial configurations according to evaluations based on social
welfare and ecological footprint indicators. Five spatial configurations are considered
for this purpose. The exercise is operationalized with the help of a two-region model
of the economy, that is, in line with the ‘new economic geography.’ By generating
a number of numerical ‘counter-examples,’ it is shown that the footprint method is
inconsistent with an approach aimed at maximum social welfare. Unless environmen-
tal externalities are such a large problem that they overwhelm all other components of
economic well-being, a ‘spatial welfare economic’ approach delivers totally different
rankings of alternative land use configurations than the ecological footprint.
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1 Introduction
In the large literature on sustainable development, the aspect of spatial sustainabil-
ity relating to urban and regional land use has been grossly neglected (Toman 1994;
Pezzey and Toman 2005). Nor has the equally large literature on trade and environ-
ment devoted much attention to spatial sustainability issues involving externalities
related to land use and transport. As a result, a firm basis for thinking about sustain-
able development of regions that involves an interaction between sustainable land
use, sustainable transport, sustainable location, and sustainable trade policies is lack-
ing. Here we offer such a basis, by developing a model of the spatial economy that
allows making trade-offs between environmental pressure, land use benefits, trade
advantages, and agglomeration effects. Subsequently, we use the model to perform a
welfare analysis of alternative spatial configurations of the economy.
The ecological footprint (hereafter EF) was proposed by Wackernagel and Rees
(1996) as suitable to address questions about spatial sustainability. It has, however,
been severely criticized on many grounds (e.g., Levet 1998; van den Bergh and Ver-
bruggen 1999; Ayres 2000; Costanza 2000; van Kooten and Bulte 2000; Opschoor
2000; Lenzen and Murray 2001; Ferng 2002; Jorgensen et al. 2002). Notwithstand-
ing its structural weaknesses, it has become a widely used indicator for assessing
environmental sustainability. It has in fact been used to calculate the environmental
sustainability performance of nations, regions, cities, and populations (e.g., McDon-
ald and Patterson 2004; Muñiz and Galindo 2005), while it is regularly appearing in
reports by environmental NGOs (notably WWF). Here we compare our approach
with the EF approach. The reason to revisit the EF is that the fundamental criticism
has been neither refuted nor taken into account.
Our approach allows us to evaluate the robustness of the EF by examining how its
ranking of alternative spatial configurations of an economy—covering spatial loca-
tions and spatial interactions—differs from a ranking based on a spatial welfare eco-
nomic (SWE) analysis. In this way, we hope to fulfill two aims. The first is to contribute
to a correct interpretation of the meaning of spatial sustainability. The second is to
employ a spatial economy model and ‘counter-examples’ (sets of parameter values)
to show that the EF is an unreliable guide to spatial sustainability.1
The analysis of the spatial dimensions of sustainable development is relevant for
two reasons. First, it enables us to operationalize statements about sustainability,
notably by distinguishing between sustainable and unsustainable land use, transport,
and trade. Second, it allows the linking of policy instruments and goals to concrete
strategies concerning trade, location, and transport. The welfare analysis can cover
both regional and global levels, taking into account negative externalities (e.g., pollu-
tion) and positive externalities (spillovers like agglomeration effects) from economic
activities, and advantages from trade. The inclusion of these elements in a spatial
welfare economic framework allows for relevant trade-offs to be made in the context
of spatial sustainability. Moreover, our approach generates information about various
types of land use which in turn allows the calculation of EFs. Comparison of these
with (regional and global) social welfare (that includes environmental externalities)
1 According to a referee the lack of dynamics in our and the EF approaches means that they are
not really dealing with sustainability. We agree that a full account of spatial sustainability requires
attention for dynamics. Nevertheless, our approach adds another essential feature, namely spatial dis-
aggregation, which is lacking from the large economic literature on sustainability (Pezzey and Toman
2005).
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for a number of spatial configurations permits a rigorous and systematic evaluation
of the EF.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 outlines the meth-
odological framework and describes the spatial configurations. Section 3 presents
a two-region economic model with land use, environmental externalities, agglomer-
ation effects, and interregional trade. Section 4 presents an analytical solution to the
reduced form model. Section 5 performs numerical exercises that compare welfare
and EFs for five spatial configurations. Section 6 concludes.
2 Description of the Method
We develop a two-region spatial general equilibrium model that includes behav-
ioral responses and allows for indirect effects in terms of intermediate production,
consumption, trade, income generation, and welfare. Themodel captures the environ-
mental impacts from all activities associated with particular land uses and translates
these through negative externalities into welfare effects. Moreover, a number of other
notions (or phenomena) that are crucial to a complete analysis of spatial sustainabil-
ity are included, namely agglomeration effects and advantages from trade. The EF
approach entirely omits consideration of agglomeration effects and trade advantages.
The term ‘agglomeration’ refers to the clustering of economic activities.An agglom-
eration effect represents a certain type of positive externality that arises when firms
share certain non-excludable inputs, such as labor and communication networks
(Eberts and McMillen 1999). This occurs when all complementary production facili-
ties are in close proximity, causing firms to benefit from economies of scale, minimal
transaction and communication costs, common labor markets, and shared technical
know-how (Anas et al. 1989). Many intermediate commodities and final goods are
then available at low cost. This is sometimes referred to as the ‘Silicon Valley’ effect.
Trade advantages correspond to the benefits a region receives from trading its
products with another region. This includes comparative advantage, which reflects
that one region has a higher relative productivity in one good than another region,
while the reverse holds for another good (Krugman 1991a). This characteristic causes
trade that enhances international labor division and specialization, and can result in
more efficient use of physical resources (as a result of specialization), with the gains
being only partly offset by resources consumed in transporting the commodities from
one region to another. Thismechanism is whatmotivates the ‘icebergmodel’ for trans-
port costs (Samuelson 1954), which we employ of later on. Trade further gives rise to
more competition between suppliers (i.e., less market concentration or imperfections)
which in turn leads to lower prices for consumers, thus enhancing social welfare.
A negative environmental externality or external cost arises when the produc-
tion or welfare of one economic agent (consumer or producer) is through physical
interaction negatively influenced by the choices made by another agent. Individual
decisions will then not be in line with social welfare and environmental sustainability.
The EF takes the negative effects of the economy on the environment into account
but does not consider negative externalities or environmental spillovers per se, at least
to the extent that these impose costs on economic agents. The reason is that, in the
EF approach, economic agents, and their profits or individual welfare do not receive
attention. Negative externalities may cause affected agents to produce less output.
This effect is ignored in the EF approach, but not in the spatial economic welfare
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Table 1 Possible spatial configurations
Spatial configuration Region 1 Region 2
A Agriculture-dominated area Agriculture-dominated area
B Agglomeration Agriculture-dominated area
C Agriculture-dominated area Nature-dominated area
D Agglomeration Agglomeration
E Agglomeration Nature-dominated area
F Nature-dominated area Nature-dominated area
approach. Moreover, the EF entirely omits consideration of agglomeration effects
and trade advantages. In our model, negative externalities are assumed to result from
both regional land uses (agriculture and manufacturing) and inter-regional trans-
port. Externalities affect the welfare of citizens in both regions, since both local and
global externalities are taken into account. The negative external effect on welfare
can be interpreted as implicitly covering externalities affecting both consumers and
producers.
Our model is nonetheless consistent with the EF in the sense that it covers the
same land use and consumption categories. These are cropland, grazing land, forest,
fishing grounds, built-up environment, and energy land. The spatial structure of our
model is kept as simple as possible, by assuming that the world can be divided into two
regions. This is sufficient to address the core features of (sustainable) trade, location,
and transport.
Our aim is to rank alternative spatial configurations of the two-region economy.
This economy consists of two activities, namely agriculture and manufacturing. We
distinguish three possible spatial structures for each region. One assumes an urban
concentration (agglomeration) of manufacturing activities, a second is agriculture-
dominated, and a third is dominated by nature and has a relatively low intensity of
economic activity. With these three possible regional structures we have, in principle,
32 = 9 spatial configurations for the two-region system. However, some of these are
just each others (spatial) mirror images, so that only six configurations turn out to be
relevant.2 Table 1 clarifies these in terms of combinations of spatial structures in the
two regions. Note that all activities and pure nature are present to some degree in
each region under all configurations.
We omit from our analysis spatial configuration F as it lacks a complete economy.
This is not a moral judgment concerning its desirability, but a consequence of using a
two-region economic model and assuring that the global (two-region) economy and
population under each configuration are identical in size. It guarantees that compari-
son of the different spatial configurations makes sense, as differences are not due to
the size of the population but to the spatial structure of the economy. Under configu-
ration F there is too little space available to host the economy and population. More
specifically, in the nature-dominated region there is a smaller population that has to
be compensated for by a larger population in the other region. But in the case of two
nature-dominated regions such compensation is impossible. As a result, a comparison
with the other configurations would imply comparing systems with different (global)
population sizes (for a technical explanation, see note 7 in Sect. 5).
2 Meaning that analysis of spatial configurations (x,y) in (y,x) for regions (1, 2) leads to the same
insights.
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Table 2 Economic characteristics of the spatial configurations
Spatial configuration Region Agglomeration effect Negative externalities Trade advantage
A 1 0 1 1
2 0 1
B 1 1 1 1
2 0 1
C 1 0 1 1
2 0 1
D 1 1 1 1
2 1 1
E 1 1 1 1
2 0 1
1 =Present; 0 =Absent
Table 2 shows for each of the five remaining configurations how they are charac-
terized in terms of the three core spatial economic phenomena, i.e., agglomeration
effect, negative externality, and trade advantage. Figure 1 provides a schematic rep-
resentation of these five configurations.
3 The Model
To study the relationship between spatial concentrations at different scales (country,
region, or urban) and environmental (un)sustainability in a way that is consistent
with microeconomic theory, we develop a spatial trade model following closely that
of Forslid and Ottaviano (2003). This model in turn is based on a well known model
by Krugman (1991b), who started a line of research, that is, now known as the ‘new
economic geography.’ In addition to the trade relations in these models, we include
the positive effects stemming from economies of agglomeration and (negative) envi-
ronmental externalities.
There is a clear distinction in the literature between short-run and long-run equilib-
ria. Since we are interested in assessing static spatial configurations, we only consider
short-run equilibrium, thereby ignoring migration between regions. This comes down
to assuming that the stocks of human capital and unskilled labor are exogenously
given for each region. This restriction is motivated by the intention to stick as closely
as possible to the EF approach, which assumes there is a given global population
distribution, and a given spatial population distribution for each spatial configuration.
The model captures agglomeration effects. The most significant impact of the
agglomeration of economic activities is reduced transport costs within regions due
to reduced transport distances. We assume that intraregional transport costs are im-
plicit in an agglomeration-dependent production cost parameter. We do not model
agglomeration effects endogenously (e.g., dependingondistances and transport costs),
as our intention is to analyze the impact of these effects rather than explain or de-
rive them theoretically. Therefore, we include agglomeration effects as an exogenous
factor that differs between the spatial configurations. In other words, the value of the
agglomeration parameter is set exogenously for each of the spatial configurations.
We assume that the two-region world produces two different types of goods: a
homogeneous good Fj (agriculture) and a differentiated good Mj (manufacturing),
140 Fabio Grazi et al.
Fig. 1 A schematic representation of the spatial configurations
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with j (= 1, 2) denoting region. Following Ottaviano (2001), we further suppose that
two production factors are available, unskilled labor (L) and human capital (H). In
our two-region system the total amount of unskilled workers is L = L1 + L2, while
the amount of skilled workers is H = H1 + H2.3
The production activities Fj and Mj generate a negative externality (E) that affects
both regional and global welfare. Agricultural production is characterized by constant
returns to scale and perfect competition, and ‘food’ is the numéraire good (i.e., its
price equals 1). In addition, we assume that transportation costs for food are zero, and
that one unit of unskilled labor is needed to yield one unit of food. This guarantees that
the wage of unskilled labor is equal to 1. We further assume that the manufacturing
sector produces many varieties and that each manufacturing firm produces a single
unique variety under increasing returns to scale. Therefore, the number of available
varieties in each region j, nj, is equal to the number of firms that are active in that
region. We define a price index (I) of manufactures in order to be able to treat the
various products as a single group.
The remainder of this section is devoted to motivating and specifying the model
equations. These are classified under four headings, namely demand side, supply side,
externalities and welfare, and land use.
3.1 Demand side
Given a certain income level (Yj) that a consumer earns from working in the agri-
culture or manufacturing sector in region j, he has to decide whether to spend it
on agricultural (in terms of demand, Aj) or on manufactured (Mj) goods. Utility is
defined as:4
Uj = A(1−δ)j Mδj
[
1 + (Ej + E
)]−θ , 0 < δ < 1; θ  0. (1)
Here δ is the share of income Yj spent on manufactures, Ej the negative externality
associated with domestic production and transport (air pollution, water contamina-
tion, congestion, noise, etc.,), E the global environmental externality due to total
economic activity in both regions (e.g., CO2 emissions), and θ represents the intensity
of the environmental externality in the utility function.
Concerning the demand for manufactures, let cjj(i) and cjk(i) be the consumption
levels of a particular variety i, that is, sold in region j, and produced in regions j and
k, respectively. Following Dixit and Stiglitz (1977), we define a constant elasticity
of substitution (CES), ε, to write the aggregate consumption of manufactures Mj in
region j as a function of the consumption cjj, cjk, and the N varieties:
Mj =
[ nj∫
i=0
cjj (i)(ε−1)/ε di +
nk∫
i=0
ckj (i)
(ε−1)/ε di
] ε
ε−1
,
j,k = {1, 2} , j = k, i = 1, . . . ,N, ε > 1. (2)
Here nj and nk represent the total quantity of available varieties in region j and k,
respectively, andN represents the total amount of available varieties in the two-region
system, where N = n1 + n2.
3 These relationships will serve a useful role as weights in formulating a global welfare function later
on (see Eq. 18).
4 For this and all subsequent equations containing the subindex j the specification j = 1, 2 holds but
is not repeated.
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A consumer has to satisfy the following budget constraint:
nj∫
i=0
pjj (i) cjj (i)di +
nk∫
i=0
pkj (i) ckj (i) di + Aj = Yj. (3)
Maximizing utility given in (1) subject to (3) gives consumer demand in region j for a
variety i produced in region k:
ckj (i) = pkj (i)−ε
(
Iε−1j δYj
)
. (4)
Here Ij is the CES local price index of all the i manufactures in region j, associated
with the relationship in (2) (Krugman 1991b):
Ij =
[ nj∫
i=0
pjj (i)1−ε di +
nk∫
i=0
pkj (i)
1−ε di
]1/1−ε
. (5)
Given skilled workers Hj with the relative wage rate wj, and unskilled workers Lj
with the numéraire wage as input factors, the income in each region j is generated as
follows:
Yj = wjHj + Lj. (6)
3.2 Supply side
Each variety of manufactures is produced under increasing returns to scale using both
unskilled labor L and human capital H. The quantity Hj in each region j is only used
in fixed proportions in the manufacturing sector, while the unskilled variable labor Lj
can be employed either in agriculture or in manufactured production. Fixed costs are
based on α units of H and variable costs on βj units of L per unit of manufacturing
goods. Letting wj be the wage rate for H in region j, we find the total cost χj(i) of
producing xj(i) of variety i in region j as follows:
χj (i) = αwj + βjxj (i) . (7)
The parameter βj captures the agglomeration effect. It is exogenous and differs be-
tween spatial configurations, as discussed.A lower valuemeans a larger agglomeration
effect in the respective region. A decrease in βj implies that each firm’s productivity
increases and thus the total cost of production falls. This deviates from the approach
followed by Forslid and Ottaviano (2003), who set βj equal between regions.
Due to the fixed input requirement α, the number of firms in region j (nj) is
proportional to the number of local skilled workers:
nj = Hj
α
. (8)
In order to complete the spatial dimensions of the model, trade is allowed between
the two regions. To avoid modeling a separate transportation sector, we use the ‘ice-
berg’ form of transport costs associatedwith trade ofmanufactured goods (Samuelson
1954). In particular, if one variety i of manufactured goods is shipped from region j to
region k, only a fraction 1/Tjk will arrive at the destination: the remainder will ‘melt’
during the shipment. This means that, if a variety produced in location j is sold in the
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same region at price pjj, then it will be charged in consumption location k a price pjk,
which equals:
pjk (i) = pjj (i) Tjk. (9)
Here k is the other region of j in a two-region system, and Tjk > 1 represents the
amount of manufactured good sent per unit received. Assuming that transport costs
are the same in each direction, T = Tjk = Tkj.
Each manufacturing firm is assumed to produce a single variety under internal
returns to scale. Given its monopoly power, it is clear that the firm acts to maximize
profit:
πj (i) = pjj (i) cjj (i) + pjk (i) cjk (i) − αwj − βjxj (i) . (10)
The total production xj(i) of a firm located in region j is defined by:
xj (i) = cjj (i) + Tcjk (i) . (11)
Here Tcjk(i) represents the supply to region k of variety i produced in region j, while
xj(i) denotes total production.
Recalling that pjj(i) is the price of a variety i that is both produced and sold in region
j, underDixit–Stiglitzmonopolistic competition, we have that a profitmaximizing firm
sets its price as a constant mark-up on variable cost:
pjj (i) =
(
1 − 1/ε)−1 βj. (12)
As a consequence of profit maximization behavior, firms in both the regions will
enter and exit the manufacturing sector until profits are zero, as an equilibrium condi-
tion of monopolistic competition. Then substituting (12) into (10) and setting πj (i) =
0, we find the equilibrium wage rate wj:
wj = βjxj
α (ε − 1) . (13)
Production of the agricultural good is based on production function, that is, linear
in labor. Since βjnjxj unskilled workers are required in the production process, the
level of food supply in each region j,Fj, is:
Fj = Lj − βjnjxj. (14)
The total amount of manufactures that is shipped from region j to region k equals
Tcjk, while the shipped amount of agricultural goods zj that is transferred between
regions is given by the difference between the supply for agricultural goods, Fj and
the demand for agricultural goods, Aj, in each region j:5
zj = Fj − Aj. (15)
3.3 Externalities and welfare
Production and transport generate negative externalities. We distinguish regional
from global externalities (Ej and E, respectively). Typical of many globally externali-
ties is that they are caused by uniformly mixing pollutants (notably greenhouse gases)
5 When zj assumes negative values (region 1 in configurations B,C,E) zk assumes the same values
but with the opposite sign (since zj + zk= 0).
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which are additive, i.e., it does not matter for the global effect where in space (here:
in which of the two regions) the emissions take place. Such an additive feature is
represented by the following specification:
E =
∑
j
Ej. (16)
This relationship means we assume a certain relation between global and local exter-
nalities. Complete independence of these externalities would significantly complicate
the model, and global and local externalities are often strongly correlated.
The negative externality generated in each region can be written as a function
of agricultural production (F), production of manufactures (M), and transportation
volume (T) in the following way:
Ej = E(Fj,Mj,T), E′Fj > 0, E′Mj > 0, E′T > 0.
Externalities arising from transport are related to the quantity of agriculture and
manufacturing products that are shipped between the two regions. Hence:
Ej = m
(
njxj
)a (Fj
)b
[
1 + Tckj (i) + Tcjk (i)
2
+ zk + zj
2
]d
. (17)
Here m is a constant, and a,b,d represent the measurement of the relative externality
burdens of manufacture, agriculture and transport, with a,b,d > 0 and a + b + d = 1.
The choice of multiplicative aggregation structure follows suggestions by Ebert and
Welsch (2004) about aggregation of environmental indicators. This approach can
address any type of environmental externality (e.g., CO2 emissions, noise, biodiver-
sity loss, fragmentation of nature, etc.,), and local as well global externalities.
The welfare function in region j is identical to regional utility in Eq. 1. Global social
welfare can then be defined as a weighted geometric mean of the welfare for each
region, where the weights reflect regional population sizes:
W =
[
U(
Hj+Lj)
j U
(Hk+Lk)
k
]1/H+L
. (18)
3.4 Land use
Since the EF is expressed in terms of land area (ha), a final step of our approach is to
translate economic activities into land units. This step guarantees that the comparison
between our approach and the EF is feasible. We adopt a Leontief production func-
tion, which does not allow for substitution between land and other production factors
(labor and capital). This is not severely restrictive given that we exclude dynamic
processes, notably technical progress. The latter is furthermore consistent with the
EF procedure, which considers sustainability scenarios that are based on arbitrary,
available technologies, leaving out considerations of advanced or hypothetical tech-
nologies.
Given that our two production sectors completely cover the EF categories as
explained in Sect. 2, we can establish the following set of relationships defining land
uses:
lCROPS,j = γAζj , ζ  1, (19)
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lGRAZING,j = ηAλj , λ  1, (20)
lFOREST,j = µAνj , ν  1, (21)
lBUILT,j = ξPop
1/βj
j , βj > 0, (22)
lFISHING,j = ρAσj , σ  1, (23)
lHYPOTHETICAL,j = φFj + ψMj + ωPop
1/βj
j , φ,ψ ,ω > 0. (24)
Here the terms lCATEGORY,j on the left-hand side of each equation represent the land
used to produce those goods expressed by each sub-index in theEF. The scale parame-
ters on the right-hand side allow for realizing appropriate units of measurement, while
the power function parameters allow for realizing non-linear relationships. Equations
19–21 and 23 relate agricultural and ‘fishing land’ uses to the size of the agricultural
activity. In Eq. 22, 1/βj captures the impact of agglomeration on the relationship
between built-up land and population (Popj). The latter is calculated as follows:
Popj = g
(
Lj + Hj
)
. The parameter g is the inverse of the (skilled and unskilled) labor
share of the population. Its value is chosen to fall in realistic empirical ranges and is
reported in Table 3 (EU 2004).
Equation 24 represents ‘energy land’ use. The first two terms on the right-hand side
of this equation represent the energy use by production, while the last term refers
to residential energy use. Following Wackernagel and Rees (1996), we assume that
energy land is the land required to capture CO2 emissions of fossil fuel combustion
by forestation. As it does not represent real land use, we call it ‘hypothetical land.’
The set of Eqs. 19–23 corresponds to ‘real’ (as opposed to ‘hypothetical’) land use.
The sum of all ‘real’ land uses gives total land use lREAL,j in region j, as follows.
lREAL,j = lCROPS,j + lGRAZING,j + lFOREST,j + lBUILT,j + lFISHING,j . (25)
We assume that a fraction of ‘natural land’—area covered by (pure) nature—is always
present in both regions:
lNATURE,j + lREAL,j = lTOT,j , lNATURE,j > 0. (26)
Here lNATURE,j is the area covered by nature in each region j.
6
The sum of all land uses, including hypothetical energy land, gives Wackernagel
and Rees (1996) EF (in ha). This we denote EFj1 (for each region j), to distinguish it
from an alternative EF approach, EF2j (van Vuuren and Bouwman 2005).
EF1j = lREAL,j + lHYPOTHETICAL,j . (27)
The intention of this modified EF approach was to take out the most criticized com-
ponents of the original EF, namely ‘energy land’ and ‘fishing land,’ as shown in Eq. 28.
EF2j = EF1j − lHYPOTHETICAL,j − lFISHING,j . (28)
This completes the model.
6 The presence of agriculture land use in both regions is based on Forslid andOttaviano (2003), which
imposes the restriction δ < ε
/
(2ε − 1) to ensure that food production is present in both regions.
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4 Analytical Results
In this section, we provide an analytical solution to the model described in the previ-
ous section. By substituting (9) and (12) into (5) the price index Ij can be written as
follows:
Ij = ε
ε − 1
(
njβ
1−ε
j + T1−εnkβ1−εk
)1/1−ε
. (29)
Substituting Eqs. 4, 9, 12, and 29 in Eq. 11 allows derivation of the level of production
of firms located in region j:
xj = δ
ε
(ε − 1)
βεj
(
Yj
njβ
1−ε
j + T1−εnkβ1−εk
+ T
1−εYk
T1−εnjβ1−εj + nkβ1−εk
)
. (30)
We assume unskilled workers to be evenly spread between the two regions, so that:
Lj = L/2. (31)
Substituting (31) in (6) gives income Yj in region j:
Yj = wjHj + L/2. (32)
The reduced form model can now be expressed as follows:
nj = Hj
α
, (see Eq. 8)
wj = βjxj
α (ε − 1) , (see Eq. 13)
xj = δ
ε
(ε − 1)
βεj
(
Yj
njβ
1−ε
j + T1−εnkβ1−εk
+ T
1−εYk
T1−εnjβ1−εj + nkβ1−εk
)
,
(see Eq. 30)
Yj = wjHj + L/2. (see Eq. 32)
By substituting (8) and (32) into (30), and the result of this into (13), we obtain two
equations in two variables, w1 and w2, which can be analytically solved. The solutions
are:
wj =
δ
/
ε
1 − (δ/ε)
L
2
2T1−εβ2(1−ε)j Hj +
[
1 − (δ/ε) + (1 + (δ/ε)) T2(1−ε)
]
β1−εj β
1−ε
k Hk
T1−ε
(
H2j β
2(1−ε)
j + H2kβ
2(1−ε)
k
)
+
[
1 − (δ/ε) + (1 + (δ/ε)) T2(1−ε)
]
β1−εj β
1−ε
k HjHk
. (33)
Nowwehave an explicit solution forwj in the exogenous parameters and exogenous
variables L and Hj. Substituting this in (32) gives a solution for Yj, while substituting
it in (13) gives a solution for xj. In turn, all other model variables can be solved as
functions of exogenous parameters.
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5 Numerical Analysis
A generalized analytical comparison of the EF and spatial welfare is not possible,
because the explicit solutions of both EF and spatial welfare in terms of the exogenous
model parameters are complicated. Therefore, we provide numerical solutions, which
is consistent with our desire to find one or more counter-examples (i.e., inconsistent
rankings of spatial configurations according to EF and spatial welfare). The analyti-
cal model solution obtained in the previous section allows us to perform numerical
analysis without having to solve a complex, non-linear system of equations (with the
associated risk of an approximate or even incorrect numerical solution). To assess the
rankings of different numerical solutions, we use realistic ranges of both the economic
and land-use parameters.
5.1 Economic parameters and exogenous variables
The base economic parameter values are consistentwith themain literature in the field
(Brackman et al. 2001). Only the parameters and exogenous variables that relate to
the concentration of manufacturing firms in each region j, namely and βj and Hj, take
contrary values. The parameter βj is set equal to 1 in the case of spatially distributed
firms, while it equals 0.5 if agglomeration occurs in region j. For the nature-dominated
region (in configurations C and E), βj is assumed equal to 2. This value is chosen
to reflect the higher costs a firm incurs in producing goods in region 2 due to the
absence of agglomeration of production activities. The total stock of human capital H
is normalized to 1, i.e., H = H1 + H2 = 1. The total endowment of skilled workers is
further assumed to be evenly spread across the two regions, so that Hj = 0.5. Only in
configurations that involve a nature-dominated region (C, E) different parameter val-
ues are used, namely H1 = 0.8 and H2 = 0.2.7 Furthermore, the exogenous variable
L (total number of unskilled workers) is normalized at 5. Equation. 31 then implies
that Lj = 2.5, which represents the number of the available unskilled workers in each
region j. The ratio of unskilled to skilled workers (here assumed 5/1) is in the order
of magnitude of what is common in real world cases (OECD 2006).
5.2 Land-use parameters
Two types of parameters characterize each of the land-use Eqs. 19–24, namely scale
and non-linearity (power function exponent) parameters. To the former type belong
the parameters γ , η,µ, ξ , ρ,φ,ψ , and ω, whereas to the latter type ζ , λ, ν,
and σ .
To start with the scale parameters, these can be interpreted as denoting the effi-
ciency of (agricultural or manufacturing) production in terms of use of the factor
land. In order to assess their values, we followWackernagel and Rees (1996). We first
estimate world production (in metric tons, Mt) for each of the food products asso-
ciated with particular land use categories, using data from FAOSTAT (FAO 2002).
The land required to support the production of one metric ton of food products for
these same categories is calculated employing data from WWF (2002). The value is
7 This immediately clarifies why configuration F (both regions nature-dominated) was left out; it
cannot host the regional economic activities (manufacture and agriculture). In terms of the model
parameters,H1 andH2 would not add up to one, because for a region to be nature-dominatedHj < 0.5
needs to be satisfied.
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in ha/Mt. The value of parameter ξ in Eq. 22 is calculated by dividing the global
built-up surface area by the world population, in order to find the per-capita land use
of this type (ha/capita). Concerning the parameters φ,ψ , and ω in (24), their values
are assessed using data from FAOSTAT (FAO 2002) on world agricultural production
(expressed in million dollars per unit of world GDP), fromWorld Development Indi-
cators (World Bank 2004) on world manufacturing production (expressed in million
dollars per unit of world GDP), and fromWorld Energy Outlook (IEA 2002) on CO2
emissions from fuel combustion by sector (i.e., emissions from agricultural, manufac-
turing and residential sectors, all expressed in million tons of CO2). Dividing CO2
emissions caused by agriculture, manufacturing and residential sectors through world
agricultural production, world manufacturing production and the world population,
respectively, gives three coefficients expressing the emissions associated with normal-
ized production units for each sector (i.e., in tons of CO2 /$, tons of CO2/$, and tons of
CO2/capita, respectively). To derive the land needed to absorb the emissions per unit
of output from the economic sectors, we apply the conversion factor by Wackernagel
and Rees (1996), which is equal to 0.56 (i.e., 1/1.8) ha per ton of CO2. Finally, the
values for φ,ψ ,ω in (24) are derived by dividing the conversion factor by the emis-
sions generated by each sector’s production activity (φ,ψ ,ω are then expressed in
ha/$, ha/$, and ha/capita, respectively). The resulting values of economic and land-use
parameters are shown in Table 3.
Thepower function exponents express thenon-linearity of the relationship between
the volume of production for a particular consumption category and the land needed
to support it. For the sake of simplicity their values are set equal to one, which can be
interpreted as adopting linear approximations of the real effects.
5.3 Results and discussion
Rankings of the five spatial configurations in Table 1 are compared on the basis of
welfare and the two types of EF, using Eq. 18, 27, and 28, respectively. We determine
the results at both the regional and the world level. Configurations with the highest
welfare and the lowest EF are most desirable. The rankings for our configurations are
reported in Table 4.
Table 3 An overview of parameter values
Economic parameter Value Land use parameter Value
α 5 γ (ha/tons)ζ 0.17
βj 0.5; 1; 2 ζ 1
δ 0.4 η(ha/tons)λ 3.76
ε 1.7 λ 1
θ 0.1 µ(ha/tons)ν 4.86
a 0.5 ν 1
b 0.3 ξ(ha/capita)1/βj 0.1
d 0.2 ρ(ha/tons)σ 17.7
H 1 σ 1
L 5 φ(ha/$) 0.00054
T 1.79 ψ(ha/$) 0.00011
g 2.2 ω(ha/capita) 0.11
The values of parameters δ and ε are arbitrarily chosen to satisfy the condition: wj > 1, so that skilled
workers have a higher wage than unskilled workers (whose wage rate is set equal to unity)
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Table 4 Ranking of the spatial configurations according to welfare and footprint
Approach Ranking (1: most favorable; 5: least favorable)
1 2 3 4 5
SWE D E B C A
EF1 C A B E D
EF2 C A B E D
Table 5 Absolute values for the three indicators
Spatial configuration Region/World SWE (Meu) EF1 (ha) EF2 (ha)
A 1 1 0.362 53.94
2 2 0.197 53.94
1 + 2 1+ 2 0.267 107.88
B 1 1 0.45 67.96
2 2 0.21 51.01
1 + 2 1+ 2 0.31 119
C 1 1 0.442 63.13
2 2 0.146 43.7
1 + 2 1+ 2 0.268 106.8
D 1 1 0.46 65.03
2 2 0.25 65.03
1 + 2 1+ 2 0.34 130.1
E 1 1 0.57 77.91
2 2 0.18 42.56
1 + 2 1+ 2 0.33 120.5
Meu stands for Monetary equivalent unit
The most important finding is that the welfare evaluation ranks alternatives very
differently than (almost opposite to) the evaluation based on the two EF indicators.
Notably, the least favorable configuration under the EF is the most favorable under
SWE. A second finding is that the two EF approaches give rise to identical rankings,
even though the (absolute) values of EF1 and EF2 differ (see Table 5). This outcome
is remarkable, given that the second EF indicator (EF2) is the result of an effort to
improve the original (Wackernagel and Rees) EF method (EF1). We have examined
whether this result holds for different values (see sensitivity analysis below), and it
turned out to be a very robust result. One explanation is that hypothetical land use and
real land use are very much correlated in the configurations in Table 1, which is also
true for industrialized countries in the real world. For many rich countries, ‘energy
land’ is a little over half of the total EF (EF1).8 This suggests a high correlation
between EF1 and EF2.
Further insight into the results can be obtained by interpreting the specific rankings
according to the welfare and EF criteria in Table 4. This shows that, under limited
externality effects, starting from any configuration, and changing a region’s structure
to an agglomeration contributes positively to global welfare and negatively to the
global ecological footprint.9 The reason is that in terms of the welfare criterion the
8 For example, 54% for the USA, 56% for Canada, and 60% for the Netherlands (Wackernagel and
Rees 1996).
9 For example, from an EF perspective, configuration A always performs better than B, while the
opposite holds for performance in terms of welfare.
150 Fabio Grazi et al.
Table 6 Ranking of the spatial configurations at a regional level
Approach Region Ranking (1: most favorable; 5: least favorable)
1 2 3 4 5
SWE Region 1 E D B C A
Region 2 D B A E C
EF1 Region 1 A D B C E
Region 2 E C B A D
EF2 Region 1 A D B C E
Region 2 E C B A D
extra positive externality of agglomeration dominates the extra negative environmen-
tal externality associated with it. Configuration C is regarded as more desirable than
A from both the EF and (spatial) welfare angles. Yet, this occurs for different reasons.
For example, according to both EFs the economy of region 2 is more attractive under
configuration C than under A, because the first goes along with less land use. Spa-
tial welfare, on the other hand, regards region 2 as more attractive under C than A
because of a lack of local environmental externalities in the nature-dominated region
in configuration C. Note that simulations without local environmental externalities
(i.e., a different specification ofUj in Eq. 1) show that, according to the SWE criterion,
configurationAmight be preferred to C. This makes sense as under configuration C in
the nature-dominated region 2 there are no local environmental externalities anyhow,
regardless of the specification of Uj.
When the externality effect becomes large relative to the agglomeration effect, we
obtain the case which is examined below ( see ‘sensitivity analysis’ section).
5.4 Regional analysis
What can our results say about global versus regional evaluations of welfare and the
EF? The outcomes in Table 6 show that, in general, regional, and global welfare eval-
uation do not render the same rankings.10 This is not surprising given that regional
evaluations are partial in nature, while a global evaluation is more general and there-
fore preferred.
5.5 Sensitivity analysis
Next we perform a sensitivity analysis. The two crucial parameters to be examined
are Hj, the number of skilled workers that are active in each region j, and the param-
eter θ , which represents the intensity of the environmental externality. Hj reflects the
spatial distribution of the global population, which is a fundamental determinant of
the spatial features of both the economy and its environmental impacts. Parameter θ
is important because it allows for changes in the ratio between net market benefits
and environmental costs of economic activities. With regard to the first parameters,
we consider as an alternative setting H1 = 0.6 and H2 = 0.4 (instead of 0.8 and 0.2,
respectively) for configurations C and E, to reflect a different degree of concentration
10 Rankings based on the global and regional EFs differ as well. To see this for EF1: Configuration
A is regarded as optimal for region 1, and configuration E for region 2. However, configuration C is
optimal from the global EF perspective.
Spatial welfare economics versus ecological footprint 151
Table 7 Ranking of the spatial configurations; other parameter values (H1 = 0.6; H2 = 0.4, in
configurations C and E)
Approach Ranking (1: most favorable; 5: least favorable)
1 2 3 4 5
SWE D E B A C
EF1 C A B E D
EF2 C A B E D
Table 8 Ranking of the spatial configurations; other parameter values (θ = 50)
Approach Ranking (1: most favorable; 5: least favorable)
1 2 3 4 5
SWE C A E B D
EF1 C A B E D
EF2 C A B E D
of economic activities (manufacturing) in the nature-dominated region. This evidently
is an important issue in the debate on spatial sustainability. As a result, the global
welfare and EF rankings are altered, as shown in Table 7. We now find that the spatial
welfare and EF ranking are completely opposite to each other. A comparison of the
second and third rows of Tables 4 and 7 shows that rankings based on theEF indicators
(EF1 and EF2) do not change. In other words, unlike the SWE, the EF indicators in
this case are insensitive to changes in the human capital parameters, Hj. This confirms
once more the shortcomings of the EF.
Finally, we increase the value of θ from 0.1 through 2–50, which changes the inten-
sity of the environmental externality. Results reported in Table 8, show that welfare
and EF rankings tend to converge. This makes sense since, for sufficiently high θ ,
environmental externalities completely dominatewelfare.Under these circumstances,
environmental externalities are no longer kept in balance by agglomeration and trade
effects. The welfare analysis then approaches a one-dimensional environmental EF
analysis. However, as can be seen from the columns 3 and 4 in Table 8, SWE and EF
are not entirely identical in their rankings (not even for values of θ greater than 50).
This is due to the fact that negative environmental externalities and land use are not
perfectly correlated in the model—and neither in reality.11
6 Conclusion
Spatial sustainability has been neglected in the literature on sustainable develop-
ment. As a result, thinking about the sustainable development of regions, sustainable
transport, sustainable location, and sustainable trade policies has tended to be ad hoc.
The EF is a good example of this. Using a formal spatial model, we have demon-
strated that welfare rankings that take environmental externalities into account can
be inconsistent with rankings based on the EF. The spatial model is regarded as a
11 Complete convergence of the SWE and EF rankings did occur for simulations with a version of
the model that excluded local externalities.
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quite reliable theoretical guide to spatial sustainability, because it covers agglomer-
ation effects, environmental externalities, and trade advantages. By implication, the
EF is not a reliable guide to spatial sustainability.
The conclusion is that global welfare evaluation is preferred when analyzing spatial
sustainability and sustainable trade issues. The global and especially regional EF do
not provide information that is useful from the perspective of welfare-enhancing sus-
tainable development. Only in the case where environmental externalities are so large
that they dominate all other components of economic welfare, including agglomera-
tion and trade effects, EF and spatial welfare evaluations tend to converge. However,
this is not a very accurate depiction of a reality, if only because agglomeration and
trade advantages are an indispensable part of life.
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